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tempts to disseminate Georgian nation-
ality among the inhabitants of Ajaria go
back to the late nineteenth century
when political control over the region
shifted from the Ottoman to the Tsarist
Empire. These early attempts were
largely unsuccessful and up to the Sovi-
et era inhabitants of Ajaria primarily de-
fined themselves in terms of religion
and locality.
Soviet attempts to curtail the influ-
ence of Islam had more lasting results.
Starting in the late 1920s, Soviet author-
ities arrested and deported numerous
religious leaders and they closed or de-
stroyed virtually all mosques and madrasas in Ajaria. Such measures were
similar to atheist policies in other parts of the Soviet Union, but the con-
ditions in which they occurred were unusual. The Soviet regime had
granted Ajaria autonomous status but not, as usual, on the basis of ‘na-
tionality’ or ‘ethnicity’. Rather it was granted with regards to religious af-
filiation. This meant that Ajarians were unable to further their interests in
the name of the ‘development of nations’, since in official classifications
of their group Ajarians were Georgians and only differed in their religious
background. Moreover, for a long time the political élite of Ajaria consist-
ed predominantly of non-Muslim Georgians who held strong anti-Turkish
and anti-Islamic sentiments, and eagerly adopted Soviet policies aimed at
curtailing the influence of Islam. These and other factors caused severe
problems for the organizational structure of Islam – problems that were
very difficult to overcome even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
During the Soviet period the Muslim Ajarians increasingly started to
identify themselves as Georgians. An important reason why national dis-
course became effective in Ajaria was that expressions of Georgian na-
tional identity were then – at least partly – disconnected from religion. In
other words, because religion was banned from the public domain, Ajari-
ans could come to see themselves as Georgians. This state of affairs
changed in the late 1980s when, in the wake of national resurgence,
Georgian nationality was tightly reconnected to Christianity. In the
emerging hegemonic discourse Georgian and Muslim identities became
incompatible, creating a dilemma for Ajarians who saw themselves as
both. 
Incompatibilities 
State-atheism and a dominant national Georgian discourse provided
the basis for accelerated Christianization of the region after the commu-
nist collapse. This can be further illustrated by looking at the way religious
and national identities have been negotiated in everyday life on the fron-
tier. In the post-Soviet era, increased expectations of what it entails to be
Muslim ran counter to increased demands for displaying loyalty to the
Georgian nation. This forced inhabitants of Ajaria to articulate their social
identities in new ways. During my research in Ajaria it was fairly uncom-
mon for Ajarians to present themselves as different from Georgians, and
instead most people made it clear that they considered themselves to be
Georgians, sometimes specifying that they were Muslim Georgians. They
stressed that ‘religion’ and ‘nationality’ were different categories, but dis-
tinguishing between the two often proved difficult. For example, young
Muslims spoke frequently of painful encounters with Christian Georgians
in which their religious affiliation was challenged or ridiculed, or in which
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Before the Soviet period, Ajarians ad-
hered to Sunni Islam and were de-
scribed in Russian administrative docu-
ments and travel reports as devout Mus-
lim believers and staunch opponents to
Christian forces attempting to occupy
the region. During the Soviet period,
state policies weakened Muslim reli-
gious institutions and largely relegated
Islam to the domestic domain. Never-
theless, with time it became clear that
Islam retained importance as a space of
personal refuge. Despite this ‘persis-
tence’ of Islam in Soviet years, an accel-
erating process of conversion to Chris-
tianity took place immediately after the Soviet collapse. This process was
paralleled by the establishment of new churches and spiritual schools,
both of which were part of the Georgian Orthodox Church’s stated intent
to Christianize the region. To understand the current decline of Islam and
rise of Christianity, the process needs to be interpreted in light of the
structural position of Ajaria within (Soviet) Georgian administrative and
ideological frames. The particularities of Ajaria’s position resulted in in-
compatibilities of national and religious identities as played out in the
politics of everyday life. As religious and national identities are tightly in-
terwoven in Ajaria, changes in the nature of the ‘state’ have had discern-
able effects on the rigidity and shape of a new religious frontier. 
D i s / c o n t i n u i t i e s
The political leadership of Ajaria and the local intelligentsia express
clear-cut views on Islam. They typically present Islam as an undesired
residue of the Ottoman past and stress that it is only a matter of time be-
fore Ajaria will be fully Christianized. Conversions to Christianity are pre-
sented as a return to Ajarians’ ‘native’ Georgian faith and as the comple-
tion of a process of Ajarian ‘re-unification’ with the Georgian nation. At-
In the Caucasus as elsewhere in the former
Soviet Union, religion gained important
momentum after the abolishment of state-
atheism and the demise of communism.
T h e renewed importance and visibility of
religion in this region is often explained as
a return to, or revival of, pre-Soviet religious
practices and beliefs. However, the religious
dynamics in Georgia’s southwestern
autonomous region Ajaria radically contest
such explanations. Here, the borders between
Islam and Christianity are shifting in favour of
the latter following increased confrontations
with post-Soviet Georgian nationalism.
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they were derogatorily called ‘Tatars’ or ‘Turks’. Difficulties of reconciling
Muslim and Georgian identities were further strengthened by the new
educational system and the regional and national media which put great
emphasis on the Georgian Christian tradition and Christian elements in
Georgian language, culture, and history. 
The difficulty of restoring or maintaining Islamic lifestyles was also evi-
dent in many aspects of everyday life. For most Muslim Ajarians, ‘new’ de-
mands of Islam ran counter to the ways they had led their lives until re-
cently. Of course non-observance of religious demands was also consid-
ered sinful during the Soviet period, but recently the issues gained signif-
icance. Informants explained that during Soviet times it was completely
normal to combine Muslim identity with a lifestyle that violated Islamic
codes of behaviour. For anyone employed in a public function, continued
observance of religious demands was not a possibility and this was ac-
cepted even by Muslim leaders. As one informant put it: ‘We didn’t think
badly of anyone who drank at work or offered wine to guests; those
things were simply unavoidable.’ But whereas then it was accepted be-
haviour for Muslim men to drink alcohol, to eat pork, or to withdraw from
the Ramadan, today it is more complicated to abstain from religious de-
mands and still maintain Muslim identity. The new possibilities for reli-
gious proliferation after socialism changed the expectations of how Mus-
lims should behave, expectations that have been hard to live up to. Infor-
mants frequently mentioned that Georgian customs of hospitality and
sociability necessitated violation of religious rules. To quote one infor-
mant: ‘We have a long tradition of wine drinking. You have to serve wine
and drink together. People would think badly of you if you said that alco-
hol was prohibited in your house. It would be the same as saying that you
are not a Georgian.’ The case is insightful because in Georgia the exten-
sive rituals of drinking are an integral part of everyday politics, of defining
who is who, and of expressing gratitude and respect. In Ajaria, moreover,
drinking has become a very powerful symbol of Georgianness. Abstaining
from it has not only made one’s social position difficult but has also been
interpreted as a rejection of the Georgian nation. 
Similar dilemmas were voiced when Muslim Ajarians talked about their
aspirations. Many young Muslims had the feeling that Islam pulled them
backwards instead of bringing them forwards. They worried about how
the insistence of Muslim leaders to teach children Arabic influenced kids’
performances at school and how a Muslim life might handicap their fu-
ture. These young Muslims were often oriented towards city life, which
had in recent years become more explicitly associated with Christianity.
These dilemmas demonstrated the incompatibility of certain versions of
Islam with the demands of the larger national society. In part this was a
legacy of the Soviet period. During that period representations of culture
and ethnicity were stripped of all Islamic connotations. This meant that
the lifestyles of Muslims could not be legitimized by the language of eth-
nicity and culture, but were instead seen as village traditions or as left-
overs of a ‘backward’ past. This continued to incapacitate the appropria-
tion of Islam in ‘cultural’ and ‘ethnic’ presentations of ‘self’, at least among
those who had embraced the national Georgian ideal. But these difficul-
ties also hint at possible breaches in the frontier. Over the last ten years,
new versions of Islam have been introduced and the relevance of the
state in the lives of individuals has changed. 
Frontiers of identity
Inhabitants of Ajaria have responded differently to the dilemmas out-
lined above. A brief summary of the material gathered in the district cen-
tre of Khulo – a town of 6,000 inhabitants located in the Ajarian highlands
– offers further insight into the patterns of religious change. 
Families in which one or several members converted to Christianity in
recent years had typically belonged to the Soviet middle class. They at-
tributed much value to education and sent their children to Georgian
cities to attend university. Members from these families used to have po-
sitions in the state structure and often had lived part of their lives in urban
areas in Georgia. They were less inclined to comply with local customs
and traditions and more apt to conform to what was seen as ‘modern’ or
‘civilized’ Georgian society. Civil servants, teachers, and higher adminis-
trative personnel dominate the ranks of new Christians. This educated
class actively contributes to the furthering of Christian expansion be-
cause it strengthens the prevailing nationalist Christian discourse in
Ajaria among their students, in the press, and simply because of their so -
cial position as brokers between the political élite and the local popula-
tion. What is more, the fact that the middle class increasingly turns to
Christianity contributes to the further isolation of Muslim voices.
Families that at least nominally adhered to Islam tended to have occu-
pations related to agriculture and technique; they predominantly ac-
quired only primary education and usually married within the region.
They defended their religious affiliation in terms of familial and commu-
nal identity and stressed that they remained true to the beliefs and values
of their parents and grandparents. While upholding the value of Islamic
traditions they also by and large accepted the messages of Georgian na-
tionalism. This ambiguous stance did not solve the incompatibility of
Muslim obligations with expectations of ‘Georgian’ behaviour in daily life,
resulting in dilemmas that over time often led to withdrawal from direct
involvement in religion. In other words, these Muslims acted in an envi-
ronment in which identification with Islam was contradicted by the de-
mands of a state within which they imagined their lives. 
However, among the younger generation there are those who found
new ways of integrating competing discourses in their personal lives.
New contacts across the formerly impermeable border with Turkey of-
fered new visions of Islam that seem more compatible with the aspira-
tions Ajarians hold for the future. Young men who had studied in Turkey
brought back a ‘purified’ version of Islam that served as an alternative to
the ‘village Islam’ to which they objected. Moreover they used the exam-
ple of Turkey to prove that ‘modernization’ and ‘Islam’ were not mutually
exclusive. Interestingly, among those who were the least bothered by na-
tional discourse and its negative portrayal of Islam were entrepreneurs
who engaged in transnational trading activities. For them, it seemed,
Islam served as a space of refuge that eased the uncertainties of the post-
socialist era and was valued as a source of common identity in establish-
ing contacts during their travels to Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
These examples suggest that in some ways the state may lose its central-
ity in how people imagine and construe their lives. The opening of the
border with Turkey in the 1990s and the diminished capacity of the state
in providing for the necessities of life may cause people to structure their
lives increasingly around other points of reference, be they transnational
trading networks or religious centres in the Muslim world. 
In Ajaria the frontier between Islam and Christianity is changing. Be-
sides a shift of the frontier in favour of Christianity, the nature of that fron-
tier has changed as well. The ‘new’ demands of religion and nationality
have become increasingly difficult to combine, and the resulting contra-
dictions necessitate that Ajarians find new ways to reconcile religious and
national identities. The constant confrontation with the opposing ten-
dencies of Islamic and Georgian-national discourses has often forced
them to take sides. The result is the emergence of new religious bound-
aries on the frontier of the Muslim and Christian realms. But as the nature
of the state is changing it is uncertain how stable
these new boundaries will prove in the future. As
people’s lives are increasingly detached from the
structures of the state, loyalties and frames of refer-
ences may shift and new borders of identity on the
religious frontier may consequently be drawn. 
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